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SLOVITER, Chief Judge 
 
 Richard C. Watters appeals the district court's order 
under Rule 50(a) dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against the City of Philadelphia, Police Commissioner Willie L. 
Williams and Managing Director David Pingree (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "the City") for denial of his First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.  Watters' claim arose out 
of his termination from employment as Manager of the Employee 
Assistance Program (EAP) for the Philadelphia Police Department 
following the publication of a newspaper article in which he was 
quoted criticizing aspects of the EAP.   
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In 1987 then-Police Commissioner Kevin Tucker solicited 
Watters to leave his employment with the Princeton Medical Center 
and to accept a position as Manager of the Employee Assistance 
  
Program for the Philadelphia Police Department.  The idea for a 
coordinated EAP grew out of a study conducted by the Philadelphia 
Police Study Task Force which Tucker had convened "to review all 
aspects of the Philadelphia Police Department and to make 
recommendations . . . for improvement in the way this vital 
service is provided to the citizens of Philadelphia."  App. at 
30.   
 The Task Force's report, Philadelphia and Its Police: 
Toward a New Partnership, issued in 1987, emphasized the 
importance of providing stress management and psychological, drug 
and alcohol counseling services to officers.  The Task Force 
found "significant barriers and limitations" in the existing 
counseling programs and noted the lack of a "clear commitment" by 
the Department to an employee assistance program, "the lack of a 
comprehensive program for assisting employees with alcohol, drug 
or psychological problems, and police employees' suspicions of 
treatment programs, including fear of being dismissed, 
disciplined or stigmatized."  App. at 44.  The Task Force 
concluded that "procedures must be established that allow an 
officer to be referred to treatment before the problem gets out 
of hand [and that a] key to convincing employees that they can 
get help is for the Department to ensure the confidentiality of 
the program. . . ."  App. at 44.  The Task Force specifically 
recommended hiring a "program coordinator with psychological 
  
counseling training" and developing a formal employee assistance 
policy.  App. at 45.   
 Watters was charged in his appointment letter with 
managing the EAP "as outlined in the recommendations of the 
Philadelphia Police Study Task Force Report."  App. at 123.  The 
defendants do not deny that pursuant to that charge Watters 
upgraded and consolidated existing services, added educational 
programs, and supervised the professional training of the 
counselors.  Again following the Task Force's recommendations, he 
oversaw the formation of internal and external advisory 
committees to draft an employee assistance policy.  One draft 
policy statement addressed issues of confidentiality and 
specified the services the EAP would provide.  App. at 51-52.  
Another outlined a Traumatic Incident Management Program.  App. 
at 53-55.   
 The genesis of Watters' employment problems apparently 
lay in his attempts to get formal and public acceptance of those 
policy statements by the Police Commissioner.  Watters submitted 
the draft policy statements to Commissioner Tucker in 1988 for 
his approval.  Tucker told Watters orally to implement the 
services.  He testified that he approved the goals Watters had 
set but that in light of his forthcoming retirement he deferred 
decisions on a formal policy to his successor.  Tucker resigned 
in June 1988 and was succeeded by Commissioner W. Willie 
Williams.   
  
 Watters then sought formal approval of the draft 
policies from Williams but was again disappointed.  Williams 
testified that he told Watters that it might take up to eighteen 
months to get consensus on the policy issues but that Watters had 
the authority to do whatever was necessary in the meantime to run 
the EAP.  App. at 605-06.   
 According to Watters, the lack of official policies 
caused problems in at least two areas -- one dealing with 
maintaining confidentiality as to the identity of police officers 
who sought counseling and the other dealing with reimbursement 
for certain services referred to providers by the EAP rather than 
by the City's workers' compensation program.  Explaining the 
reason for his concern about confidentiality, Watters testified, 
"[O]ne of the counselors . . . made it clear that if a police 
officer were to have revealed to him that he had a chemical 
dependency problem, that he would Mirandize him, he would arrest 
him."  App. at 189.  Defendants maintain that confidentiality was 
protected unless an officer posed a danger to himself or others.  
There is evidence in the record that existing departmental policy 
required reporting any police officer who was using drugs.  App. 
at 181-82.   
 Watters also described difficulties with reimbursement 
for an outside referral.  He stated: "I received a letter from 
the police department safety officer telling me that the police 
department would not reimburse this employee for those services 
  
because the employee assistance program did not have a mandate to 
act in that capacity."  App. at 214.  According to Watters, some 
officers viewed the EAP with mistrust and challenged him every 
day with questions about its legitimacy.  They told him that the 
EAP was a "bogus program" because "without the authority 
authorization [sic] of the policy statement, it was meaningless."  
App. at 220.  
 Watters' dissatisfaction with managing the EAP without 
the policy statements grew.  He was concerned "[t]hat we were 
operating in an unethical way.  That we were viewed as having 
some service that didn't exist.  That I would be responsible or 
liable for supervising or directing a program that wasn't 
authorized to exist."  App. at 219.  In August 1989, Watters 
wrote to Chief Deputy Solicitor Ralph J. Teti seeking guidance 
about the legal and ethical difficulties he perceived in 
providing the EAP services without a signed policy statement.  
App. at 220-22.     
 In November 1989, because of his concerns over the lack 
of formal Departmental policies, Watters decided to scale back 
the EAP services to the level they were prior to his becoming the 
EAP manager.  App. at 228-29, 234-35.  Watters testified that he 
informed Commissioner Williams and Deputy Commissioner James 
Clark of his decision.  Clark instructed Watters to continue 
providing the services but Watters responded that he could not 
ethically do so.  App. at 230-32.  Shortly thereafter Watters 
  
refused to provide referrals for outside counseling for the 
family of a slain officer because he believed that, without a 
clear policy mandate, the referral could interfere with the 
family's receipt of workers' compensation benefits.  App. at 232-
34.  He was not disciplined for this refusal to provide referral 
services.  App. at 234.  
 In April 1990, a reporter for The Philadelphia Inquirer  
approached Watters with questions about the EAP.1  On April 19, 
1990 an article appeared in that newspaper under the headline 
"Dispute puts counseling program for police in limbo."  The 
article states that "[the EAP] has ground to a virtual standstill 
in the services it offers, stymied by an internal dispute over 
the scope of its effort."  The article continues, "According to 
Dick Watters, the head of the Employee Assistance Program, the 
turmoil has its roots in the way the program was set up--the 
department, he said, never formally authorized counseling for 
anything but alcohol problems" and "What has frustrated program 
counselors, Watters said, is that authorization is crucial to 
effective service.  Without it, he said, there have been problems 
of liability, difficulties in worker's compensation cases and 
snafus in reimbursement for care referrals, all of which have 
undercut the coordinated system of service envisioned by the task 
                     
1
.  This was actually the second newspaper article for which 
Watters was interviewed.  On December 13, 1989 The Northeast 
Times published an article in which Watters discussed the lack of 
a policy statement.  No discipline resulted from this interview.   
 
  
force."  The article continues, (quoting Watters): "'It's been a 
charade from the start.'--so he decided to pull the plug to make 
a point.  'I'm taking a risk.  We're creating a crisis.  The 
program's not here.  Somebody's got to make a decision.'"  App. 
at 56.  Watters agreed at trial that in general the reporter 
accurately paraphrased him, but noted that he did not say that he 
"pulled the plug to make a point."   
 As soon as the article was published, Williams summoned 
Watters to his office.  Watters claims that Williams told him 
that he should not have talked to the reporter and that he was an 
abomination and unfit for public service.  App. at 242-44.  On 
April 26, 1990, Watters was again summoned, and this time was 
informed of his termination.   
 Williams testified that the April 19 article was his 
first knowledge that the EAP services had been cut back, and that 
at his meeting with Watters immediately thereafter he asked 
whether and why he had reduced services and who had given him the 
authority to do so.  He testified that Watters admitted that he 
had made the statement that he "pulled the plug" and said that he 
had stopped providing crisis counseling and the morning 
information meetings because he felt he lacked authority.  It was 
Williams' view that "[Watters] was obligated as a city employee 
to provide those services."  App. at 627.   
 Williams also discussed the article with Managing 
Director David Pingree, who testified that Williams was concerned 
  
that Watters had taken actions to hinder the operation of the EAP 
but "I don't recall the Commissioner being concerned relative to 
Mr. Watters speaking to the press."  App. at 719.  Pingree 
suggested that Williams should look into whether services had 
been reduced.  Williams verified that some services had been 
stopped and recommended firing Watters, which Pingree authorized.  
Six months later, Williams issued two written policy statements.  
One was entitled "Employee Assistance Program for Sworn Personnel 
And Their Families," and was substantially similar to that 
proposed by Watters.  The other which mandated counseling for any 
officer involved in a police shooting, also addressed issues 
Watters had raised.  App. at 633-35. 
 Watters filed his section 1983 suit against the City of 
Philadelphia, Mayor W. Wilson Goode, Police Commissioner 
Williams, and Managing Director Pingree claiming violations of 
the due process and freedom of speech clauses of the United 
States Constitution.  The district court granted defendants' 
motion for judgment as a matter of law after the close of 
evidence at trial,2 holding that Watters' speech was not on a 
matter of public concern and that the "speech activity 
interfer[ed] with the Police Department's interests in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees."  App. at 756-58.  
                     
2
.  On April 25, 1991 the district court had granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss the due process claim and all claims against 
Mayor Goode.  Watters does not appeal those rulings.   
  
 We exercise plenary review of the district court's 
grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law.  Walter v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993).  Such a 
motion should be granted only if "viewing all the evidence which 
has been tendered and should have been admitted in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide 
in that party's favor."  Id. (citation and quotation omitted). 
This court has an obligation to make an "'independent 
constitutional judgment on the facts of the case'" as to whether 
the speech involved is constitutionally protected.  Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 n.10 (1983) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 The Supreme Court has remarked that it is essential 
that public employees be able to speak out freely on questions of 
public concern without fear of retaliatory dismissal.  See 
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).  Judicial 
vigilance is required to ensure that public employers do not use 
their authority to silence discourse on matters of public concern 
simply because they disagree with the content of the employee's 
speech.  See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).  
Nonetheless, our precedents counsel that "the State has interests 
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that 
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with 
  
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."  
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.  Therefore, in determining whether 
the speech of an employee deserves constitutional protection, 
this court must strike "a balance between the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees."  Id.    
 We analyze a public employee's claim of retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity under a three-step process.  
First, plaintiff must show that the activity in question was 
protected.  Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 
1983).  To be protected the speech must be on a matter of public 
concern, and the employee's interest in expression on this matter 
must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to 
the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.  Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1884 (1994) 
(plurality opinion) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, and 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).   
 Second, plaintiff must show that the protected activity 
was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory 
action.  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 287 (1977).  Finally, defendant may defeat plaintiff's 
  
claim by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the same action would have been taken even in the absence of the 
protected conduct.  Id.  
 In this case we need not reach the latter two steps.  
The district court found that Watters had made a sufficient 
showing that the speech was a substantial factor motivating the 
termination to submit the question of the actual reason for 
Watters' termination to the jury.  App. at 754.  The only 
question before this court is the legal one of whether the 
district court erred in its determination that Watters' speech 
was not a matter of public concern and that it interfered with 
the Police Department's efficient delivery of services.  By 
arguing that the speech was of no public interest or that it was 
of "low public interest" and was outweighed by the City's 
countervailing interest in requiring loyalty of Watters, the City 
appears to concede, at least for purposes of this appeal, that 
the speech was a motivating factor in Watters' termination.3 
A. 
Matter of Public Concern 
                     
3
.  Whether the speech was a substantial factor in the 
retaliatory action and whether Watters would have been fired 
anyway remain issues in contention between the parties.  See 
Johnson v. Lincoln University, 776 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("second and third questions . . . should be submitted to the 
jury"); see also Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 79 n.6, 80 (3d 
Cir.) ("these inquiries [whether a substantial or motivating 
factor and whether same actions would have been taken regardless] 
. . . are for the jury"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988).      
  
 The threshold issue is whether Watters' speech was on a 
matter of public concern.  Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 
1258, 1270 (3d Cir. 1994).  An employee's speech addresses a 
matter of public concern when it can be "fairly considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community."  Holder, 987 F.2d at 195 (citing Connick, 461 
U.S. at 146).  Speech by a public employee "as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern" is distinguished from speech by "an 
employee upon matters of only personal interest" for which, 
"absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not 
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction 
to the employee's behavior."  Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.  The 
public concern inquiry is a legal one, to be determined by the 
"content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by 
the whole record."  Id. at 147-48 & n.7.    
 Watters spoke to a reporter with The Philadelphia 
Inquirer about the grave problems he perceived in operating the 
EAP without a written policy statement.  The content of Watters' 
speech on its face appears to address a matter of significant 
public concern.  There is ample evidence in the record that the 
existence of an effective EAP had been a matter of public 
interest for some time.  Former Commissioner Tucker testified 
that he held a press conference to announce the release of the 
Task Force's Report.  App. at 586.  Tucker also testified that an 
  
effective EAP would be of economic benefit by decreasing 
absenteeism and improving the quality of law enforcement.  App. 
at 448-49.  Commissioner Williams concurred in the importance of 
an effective EAP to the smooth functioning of the Police 
Department.   
 Watters described the stress faced by police officers 
and the role of an EAP: 
 Police officers were considered extremely important to 
the city.  They offered a very valuable service.  They 
were people who carry guns.  They were people who had 
an enormous responsibility.  They were employees who 
were under an enormous amount of stress, and the 
discharge of their responsibilities required them to 
have appropriate kinds of programs available to mediate 
the stress and to help them deal with whatever problems 
or personal problems they might have, given certainly 
their status and their significance within the city 
structure.  
 
App. at 352.   
 It follows that the availability and provision of 
counseling to a troubled police officer for addiction, stress and 
related disorders, or traumatic incidents is precisely the kind 
of issue that a citizen of Philadelphia is likely to find of the 
utmost importance.  Indeed, shortly after Watters assumed his 
duties managing the EAP, he was interviewed by a representative 
of a "community concern action group" who presented citizen fears 
that police officers under stress and carrying guns were likely 
to have some "serious accidents."  Watters sought to allay those 
fears by explaining the availability of counseling services for 
officers.  App. at 201.  
  
 Defendants do not deny that the existence of the EAP 
itself is an issue of public concern.  Instead, they seek to 
distinguish that basic issue from the particular matter Watters 
protested -- the absence of an official written policy statement 
on certain troublesome and, in his view, unresolved aspects of 
the EAP.  However, because Watters' speech raised issues which 
arguably went to the fundamental existence and efficacy of the 
EAP, that speech cannot be narrowly characterized as only 
concerning the "minute details" of program administration.  
Watters sought to inform the public of his belief that "[t]he 
policy statement would have provided some trust, a certain degree 
of comfort, a different understanding of what the organization 
was proposed to do to enable people to access the EAP without 
fears of recrimination, without fear of having records used 
against them in an investigation of some kind."  App. at 192.  If 
officers did not use the services available, the stated purpose 
of the program -- to improve the effective delivery of law 
enforcement to the public -- would be undermined.   
 Watters' view as to the nexus between written policies 
and the effectiveness of the EAP has support in the record.  A 
peer counselor for the Philadelphia Police Department, Sergeant 
William Brennan, testified that formal policies are essential 
within the Police Department because without them "[y]ou have no 
real basis for acting."  App. at 417.  Counsel for the City 
agreed at oral argument that it was unresolved whether written 
  
policy authorization was required in order for outside referrals 
by the EAP to be reimbursed.  
 We need not decide and do not take a position on the 
question of whether a written policy statement was, in fact, 
necessary to the effective operation of the EAP, as Watters 
believed.  For this purpose, it is sufficient for us to conclude, 
that the content of the speech was related to the fundamental 
existence of the EAP, a matter of public concern. 
 As such, Watters' speech differs from that at issue in 
the two cases from other circuits relied on by defendants.4   
Instead, it is comparable as a matter of law to speech by other 
public employees criticizing their employers' policies or 
practices which the Supreme Court or this court have found to 
touch upon matters of public concern.  See, e.g., Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 566 (letter to the editor criticizing Board of 
                     
4
.  In Gomez v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 794 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1986), the speech was that 
of an employee at a state facility for the mentally ill who 
informed an employee at a coordinate county facility of proposed 
administrative changes which would have affected their jobs.  The 
court held that the speech was not of public concern because the 
proposed reallocation of administrative burdens was not a matter 
of interest in the community and the speech did not alert the 
public to wrongdoing or credibly touch upon the adequacy of 
patient care.  Id. at 1021-22.  In Phares v. Gustafsson, 856 F.2d 
1003 (7th Cir. 1988), a medical records technician disagreed with 
instructions from her supervisors on coding of medical records.  
The court found that her speech was not on a matter of public 
concern because its context and form indicated that it was speech 
on a purely personal disagreement over the operation of her unit, 
and the plaintiff was not trying to expose any wrongdoing or to 
inform the public of any problems within the College of 
Veterinary Medicine.  Id. at 1008.   
  
Education's allocation of school funds); Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 
282 (telephone call to a local radio station about memorandum on 
teacher dress codes); Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 75 (3d 
Cir.) (public criticism of proposed reorganization of 
prosecutor's office), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988); Johnson 
v. Lincoln University, 776 F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir. 1985) (letters 
by university professor to accreditation body alleging low 
academic standards in university); Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 100-01 
(speeches at Board of Chosen Freeholders meetings criticizing 
practices of Division of Motor Vehicles); Monsanto v. Quinn, 674 
F.2d 990, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1982) (letters to tax commissioner 
criticizing management of tax division).     
 The defendants deny that Watters spoke on a matter of 
public concern and argue that Watters is a disgruntled employee 
seeking to turn internal office grievances into a cause celebre.  
They contend that he spoke merely "as an employee dissatisfied 
with the scope and timing of one aspect of a voluntary police 
department program because his superiors would not agree with him 
initially, and did not agree with him as soon as he wanted them 
to."  Appellees' Brief at 17.  They rely on the Supreme Court's 
cautionary statement that the "First Amendment does not require a 
public office to be run as a roundtable for employees complaints 
over internal office affairs."  Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.   
 In Connick, the speech in question was that of an 
Assistant District Attorney who circulated a questionnaire 
  
soliciting the views of her coworkers on office transfer 
policies, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, 
their level of confidence in their supervisors, and whether they 
felt pressured to work in political campaigns.  The Court held 
that only the last question spoke to a matter of public concern, 
and that the others were merely extensions of the employee's 
dispute with her superiors over her opposition to being 
transferred.  Id. at 140-49.  The questionnaire, "if released to 
the public, would [have] convey[ed] no information at all other 
than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status 
quo."  Id. at 148.  Myers did not "seek to inform the public that 
the District Attorney's Office was not discharging its 
governmental responsibilities" or "seek to bring to light actual 
or potential wrongdoing or breach of the public trust."  Id. at 
148.  Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 
(1979) (holding that even private communication to supervisors of 
complaints alleging discriminatory policies and practices 
entitled to constitutional protection). 
 The content, form and context of Watters' speech differ 
greatly.  Watters' speech was not confined to the day-to-day 
minutiae of administering a bureaucratic program, as defendants 
allege.  Rather Watters' speech linked his concerns over the lack 
of a formal policy to fundamental problems going to the heart of 
the administration of counseling services for police officers.   
  
 Although Watters also may have had some personal 
motivation for speaking, his speech was not merely an extension 
of his individual grievances.  It had been solicited by a 
newspaper reporter presumably because the problems it alleged 
about Police Department administration touched upon issues of 
"political, social, or other" concern to the community.  See Rode 
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1988) (clerk-
typist who spoke to newspaper reporter about racial animus and 
retaliation in state police department was "disgruntled employee" 
but speech was nonetheless on matter of public concern); Zamboni, 
847 F.2d at 77-78 (detective who was motivated to criticize 
reorganization of prosecutor's office in part because it was 
adverse to him still spoke on matter of public concern).  But see 
Versarge v. Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1365 (3d Cir. 1993) (fact 
that expelled member of volunteer fire department was motivated 
by "personal grudge" weighed against finding that he spoke on 
matter of public concern).    
 We also attribute some relevance to publication of the 
interview in a newspaper of general circulation.  See Rode, 845 
F.2d at 1202; see also Monsanto, 674 F.2d at 997 (holding that 
speech was matter of public concern supported by fact that issues 
deemed important enough to be subject of two radio broadcasts).  
The focus of the article went beyond the personal gripe of one 
employee, instead putting Watters' statements within the context 
of reporting on other problems facing the Department.  Its lead 
  
was: "As if the Police Department didn't have enough problems, 
crisis has come to its crisis counselors."  App. at 56.  It ties 
Watters' tenure as the EAP Manager to the program itself: "The 
program's director--hired with much fanfare at the urging of the 
Philadelphia Police Study Task Force in 1987--has been told by 
the police commissioner that there is no money to continue 
funding his job.  And the Police Department wants to revamp the 
program, possibly by farming out services to a private counseling 
agency."  It referred as well to interviews with Commissioner 
Williams and president of Lodge 5, Fraternal Order of Police, 
Richard Costello.     
 The district court too narrowly defined the scope of 
the public concern doctrine.  Surely the citizens of Philadelphia 
have an interest in knowing if a program set up to provide 
counseling services to police officers is beset with problems of 
the magnitude of which Watters, the manager of that program, 
described.  We conclude that the public had a significant 
interest in learning about problems which may have impaired the 
effective functioning of the EAP and which, in turn, could have 
affected the delivery of police services, and that therefore the 
speech was on a matter of public concern. 
  
B. 
Balancing of Interests 
 Our conclusion that Watters' speech was on a matter of 
public concern does not alone determine that the speech was 
protected by the First Amendment.  We must weigh the interests on 
behalf of the speech against the interest of the City as an 
employer "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees."  Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 
(quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).  The Government bears the 
burden to justify a discharge, and that burden "varies depending 
upon the nature of the employee's expression."  Connick, 461 U.S. 
at 150; see also United States v. National Treasury Employees' 
Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1021 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment and dissenting in part) ("As the magnitude of 
intrusion on employees' interests rises, so does the Government's 
burden of justification.").  "[T]he balancing test articulated in 
Pickering is truly a balancing test, with office disruption or 
breached confidences being only weights on the scales."  Zamboni, 
847 F.2d at 79 (citation and quotation omitted).   
 On Watters' side of the balance is his interest in 
engaging in the speech as well as the public's interest in "free 
and unhindered debate" on an issue of public importance, see 
Versarge, 984 F.2d at 1366, a "core value of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment."  See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.  
As previously recognized, "[t]he public has a significant 
  
interest in encouraging legitimate whistleblowing so that it may 
receive and evaluate information concerning the alleged abuses of 
. . . public officials."  O'Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 
1062 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 Weighed on the other side is the government employer's 
interest in "the effective and efficient fulfillment of its 
responsibilities to the public."  Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.  As 
explained recently in the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court 
in Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994), the 
government "has a freer hand in regulating the speech of its 
employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at 
large[,]" but that hand is not uncontrolled.  
 In Waters, the Supreme Court's most recent discussion 
of this issue, the Court considered whether the Connick test 
should be applied on the basis of what the government employer 
reasonably thought the employee said or what the trier of fact 
ultimately determines was said.  In that case, unlike here, there 
was a factual dispute as to what was said5 in a conversation 
                     
5
.  Only a few phrases in The Philadelphia Inquirer article may 
have been incorrectly attributed to Watters.  For example, the 
article describes how "[f]or more than three months, the program 
has stopped the informal counseling it offered routinely to 
officers involved in shootings--and has cut back counseling in 
virtually every area but alcohol abuse."  App. at 56.  Watters 
denied having said exactly these words but testified at trial "I 
told him that the service were cut back to the ones that I had 
proposed and that had never been authorized and to the services 
that existed before I inherited the counseling unit, and that the 
alcohol counseling unit continued to exist."  App. at 353.  
Watters does not deny saying most of what was in the article. 
  
between two nurses during a dinner break.  The employer acted on 
the basis of information that the disciplined employee had said 
"unkind and inappropriate negative things" about her supervisor; 
the employee contended she had merely criticized certain hospital 
policies because she believed they were impeding nursing care.  
Id. at 1882-83.    
 In an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Waters 
plurality, speaking on this issue for a majority of the Court, 
id. at 1893 (Souter, J., concurring), held that the courts should 
"look to the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be."  
Id. at 1889.  The Court then applied the Pickering balance and 
decided that, in either event, the speech was unprotected because 
whatever First Amendment value it might have had was outweighed 
by the disruption factor.  Id. at 1890-91. 
 We must consider the effect of Waters on our prior 
standard for evaluating the disruption factor relevant in the 
Pickering balance.6  In earlier cases, we required the government 
employer to show "actual disruption."  See Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 
78 (citing American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal 
Service, 830 F.2d 294, 303 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  In doing 
so, we relied on the language in Pickering that the speech in 
question was "neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any 
                     
6
.  In Feldman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823 (3d Cir. 
1994), decided after Waters, although there was evidence of some 
actual disruption, we held it did not justify plaintiff's firing 
because it was outweighed by the public interest in retaining 
someone whose job was to expose corruption.  Id. at 830-31. 
  
way either impeded the teacher's proper performance or to have 
interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally." 
See Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 79 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-
73). 
 In Waters, however, the Court decided that "the 
potential disruptiveness of the speech as reported was enough to 
outweigh whatever First Amendment value it might have had."  114 
S. Ct. at 1890.  Justice O'Connor explained that because a 
government employee, like any citizen, may have a strong, 
legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters, the 
government employer may have to "make a substantial showing that 
the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it may be 
punished."  Id. at 1887 (emphasis added).  We believe that after 
Waters, it is no longer essential to show actual disruption, 
although such evidence would obviously be highly relevant.  See 
Jeffries v. Harleston, No. 93-7876, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7639, at 
*10 (2d Cir. April 4, 1995) (Waters overturns strict actual 
interference test). 
 The Court's finding of likely disruptiveness in Waters 
was based on the employer's evidence that a potential employee 
may have been discouraged in working for a department in the 
hospital, the disciplined employee's complaints threatened to 
undermine management's authority, and the employee's own 
statement that it "wasn't possible" to "wipe the slate clean" 
between her and her supervisor.  114 S. Ct. at 1890-91.  In 
  
Rankin, the Supreme Court listed as factors relevant to 
evaluating the disruption contention "whether the statement 
impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has 
a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 
performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the 
regular operation of the enterprise."  483 U.S. at 388 (citing 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73). 
 The district court in this case did not review or 
analyze any of these factors.  Instead, in its brief discussion 
of this side of the Pickering balance7 the court concluded that 
                     
7
.  The court's entire discussion of disruptiveness in its oral 
opinion is as follows:  
 
 Mr. Watters' statements in the press describe 
a crisis, and Mr. Watters has testified that 
at least there was a crisis within the Police 
Department administration. 
 
 The crisis described by Mr. Watters here in court, and 
in the article, would clearly support a finding and 
does clearly support the Court's finding that the 
speech activity interferes with the Police Department's 
interests in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees. 
 
 Certainly it is established that there is a crisis.  
Mr. Watters set out to describe that crisis.  And 
certainly so that all prongs of the requirements to be 
protected, First Amendment activity cannot be met. 
 
 It is my view that there is no First Amendment 
protection in the context of -- for the activity in 
this case. 
 
    To create a crisis, then to report it for the purpose 
of taking the issue public in order to get certain 
  
the speech was disruptive by focusing on Watters' use of the word 
"crisis" in the article and in his testimony.8  However, the 
crisis to which Watters referred was one in the EAP, not one 
resulting from his speaking out. 
 Disruption caused by actions independent of the speech 
at issue cannot be equated with disruption caused by the speech 
itself.  In Monsanto, reviewing a record similarly lacking 
evidence of disruption caused by the speech activities of an 
employee who sent letters critical of the management of the Tax 
Division of the Virgin Islands Department of Finance, we found it 
significant that "[w]hile there was ample testimony establishing 
disharmony and discontent among the employees . . . there is only 
meager evidence establishing that this disharmony and discontent 
was specifically caused by [the] letter writing activities. . . . 
[M]uch of the discontent appears to have been the result of the 
very problems in the Tax Division to which [the] letters were 
(..continued) 
administrative orders and procedures is not protected 
conduct as I understand protected conduct. 
 
App. at 757-58. 
8
.  Similarly, although the City also contends that Watters 
admitted his policy proposals created a "crisis," nothing in the 
Watters' testimony cited by the City can be construed as 
attributing any crisis to The Philadelphia Inquirer article.  
See, e.g., App. at 361 ("The reasons for my not wanting to report 
to the first deputy commissioner created very much of a crisis 
trying to interface the employee assistance program connected 
with other departments within the organization and outside of the 
organization, with the city health service."). 
 
 
  
directed."  674 F.2d at 999.  To the extent there might have been 
"disharmony or discontent" in the Police Department over the 
functioning of the EAP there is no evidence in the record 
suggesting that it was a result of Watters' speech rather than of 
the very problems to which Watters' speech was directed.   
 The City now seeks to justify the termination of 
Watters on a basis not relied on by the district court.  It 
contends that Watters was a "policymaker" and, as such, enjoyed a 
necessarily close working relationship with the Commissioner who 
had the right to expect personal loyalty and confidence in 
return.  Certainly there are some positions in public employment 
"in which the need for confidentiality is so great that even 
completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible 
ground for dismissal" or "in which the relationship between 
superior and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate 
nature that certain forms of public criticism of the superior by 
the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of 
the working relationship."  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3.  On 
the other hand, merely saying that the relationship will be 
undermined does not make it so.  
 The paradigmatic case in which this court concluded 
that the close working relationship between employee and 
supervisor made public criticism by the employee disruptive as a 
matter of law is Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977).  In that case, we 
  
upheld the dismissal of an action based on the firing of the 
First Assistant District Attorney following an article in The 
Philadelphia Inquirer in which he sharply disputed the veracity 
of public statements made by the District Attorney.  We reasoned 
that the comments had been an "irreparable breach of confidence," 
and noted that "we could not expect a district attorney to run an 
efficient office if his first assistant were free to impugn his 
integrity in public."  Id. at 565.  However, we reached that 
conclusion based on evidence that the First Assistant District 
Attorney functioned as a virtual alter ego to the District 
Attorney.  He assisted the District Attorney in formulating 
policy, administered the office on a daily basis, kept the 
District Attorney informed about the performance of various 
units, and acted as the District Attorney when the latter was 
unavailable.  Id. at 562.  See also Propst v. Bitzer, 39 F.3d 
148, 153 (7th Cir. 1994) (ample corroboration in record of 
defendant's claim that speech highly disruptive of close working 
relationships requiring loyalty and confidence), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 1400 (1995). 
 There was no evidence submitted by the City that 
Watters' relationship with Commissioner Williams was comparable 
to the "close working relationship" between the District Attorney 
and his First Assistant.  The City does not contend that Watters 
and Williams interacted on setting policy on the wide range of 
issues faced by the Department, and indeed the EAP appears to 
  
have been a relatively discrete operation within the Police 
Department.  See Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1272-73 ("Proximity within 
an organizational hierarchy is a significant factor in the 
employer's demonstration that a public employee's speech had a 
detrimental impact on a necessarily close working 
relationship."); Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 79 (court must determine 
"whether [plaintiff's] functional role in the prosecutor's office 
was of such proximity to [his employer] that his speech destroyed 
'a needed close working relationship'"). 
 Watters enjoyed neither the level of authority nor the 
degree of responsibility exercised by the First Assistant 
District Attorney in Sprague, and he was further removed in the 
chain of command, subordinate both to the Police Commissioner and 
to the First Deputy Commissioner.  Watters was required to abide 
by the orders of his superiors.  He needed their approval to 
operate the EAP and, according to his own testimony, was unable 
to make independent policy judgments.  See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 
390 ("The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the 
words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and 
public accountability the employee's role entails.").   
 Furthermore, nothing Watters was reported to have said 
"impugn[ed] the integrity" of his superiors.  See Roseman v. 
Indiana Univ. of Pa., 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976) (significant if speaker "called into 
question the integrity of the person immediately in charge of 
  
running a department").  The Philadelphia Inquirer article 
conveys a straightforward difference of opinion over 
implementation of an important Police Department program.  The 
City has never claimed any disruption from the appearance of 
similar comments by Watters in the earlier article in The 
Northeast Times.  Nor is there evidence that Watters engaged in 
the type of complaining and negative criticism of his superiors 
within the workplace that the Supreme Court found likely to 
disrupt working relationships in Waters.  114 S. Ct. at 1890-91.9 
 Finally, defendants argue that because of its public 
safety role, a Police Department has a significantly greater 
interest in regulating the speech of its employees than do other 
public employers.  See Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 
1344 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 880 (1994); 
Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 315-16 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978).  However, Watters was a civilian 
employee and defendants have not shown why his speech was likely 
to interfere materially with Department morale or public 
confidence.  See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-92 (civilian clerical 
employee's comment about assassination attempt on President held 
protected conduct); Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 78-79 (applying 
                     
9
.  We note that there are no allegations that Watters' speech 
was knowingly or recklessly false or that his speech was 
motivated by animus.  Different considerations obtain in such a 
case.  See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); 
Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 1983).     
 
  
identical disruption standard for evaluating speech of detective 
in prosecutor's office as any other public employee); Rode, 845 
F.2d at 1202 (comments in newspaper interview by civilian 
clerical employee of state police department describing racial 
animus held protected conduct). 
 In any event, "policemen, like teachers and lawyers, 
are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional 
rights."  Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).  This 
court and others have recognized that "freedom of speech is not 
traded for an officer's badge."  Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 
F.2d 1298, 1303 (7th Cir. 1990); see also O'Donnell, 875 F.2d at 
1062.  Thus we hold that the City did not make the requisite 
substantial showing that Watters' speech was "in fact, likely to 
be disruptive," Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887, and therefore there 
was no basis for the district court to hold that Watters' speech 
disrupted the proper functioning of the Police Department. 
 In our opinion in O'Donnell, we set forth the 
appropriate procedure for this court to follow when the facts on 
record relevant to the application of the Pickering balancing 
test are undisputed.  We stated there, 
 when considering the protected status of speech, an 
appellate court must, in any event, make an independent 
constitutional judgment on the facts of the case.  
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n. 10, 103 S. Ct. at 1692 n. 
10, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983); Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 
102.  Because the undisputed facts in this record 
dictate only one result, viz., that, on balance, 
O'Donnell's speech here was protected by the first 
amendment, we feel obligated to make that 
determination.  We emphasize, however, that our ruling 
  
is based on the undisputed record before us on the 
issues resolved. 
      
875 F.2d at 1062. 
 In light of our conclusions that Watters' speech was on 
a matter of public concern, and that the City has not met its 
burden to show that the interest in the speech was outweighed by 
the interests of the City, the outcome of the Pickering balance 
is clear, and the district court erred in holding that the speech 
was not protected by the First Amendment. 
 It does not follow that this mandates a holding that 
Watters is entitled to judgment.  There remain disputed issues as 
to the reason for his termination.  Although the City did not 
contest on appeal that Watters was fired for his speech, there 
was some testimony that might allow a jury to find that he was 
terminated for insubordination because of his actions in 
unilaterally cutting back certain services provided by the EAP.10 
See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (1977).  Therefore, we rest our 
decision on the protected status of the speech, the only issue 
decided by the district court, and express no opinion as to any 
issue remaining in the district court.  
III. 
CONCLUSION 
                     
10
.  At trial Commissioner Williams testified, "I felt that his 
employment as a -- continued employment in the City of 
Philadelphia was not appropriate at this time because of the 
gross negligence he had now indicated by stopping doing those 
programs."  App. at 629. 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order granting judgment in favor of defendants pursuant 
to Rule 50(a) and remand to the district court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                  
 
